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Cops and Robbers
Looking at the Interdependent Relationship between
Police and Crime Using Differential Equations
Matthew T. Cole
ABSTRACT. This paper devises a system of differential equations to model the dual
dependency of police and crime, based on a predator/prey relationship. It emphasizes the
complexity of the relationship and shows how empirical research can be skewed if it only
focuses on a limited time interval. The system of differential equations explains why some
researchers have come to the mistaken conclusion that hiring more police induces more
crime, and gives policy makers better information with which to make decisions.

I. Introduction
Which came first, the chicken or the egg? This has been a long debated
philosophical question. It was designed to make people think, and then
realize that not every question has a clear-cut answer. At first glance, one
might reason that chickens come from eggs; therefore the egg must have
come first. But, after further thought, one realizes that eggs come from
chickens. Therefore, the chicken must have come first. The question can
be a bit frustrating.
The same reasoning can be used when investigating the relationship
between crime and police. On one hand, the amount of crime influences
the number of police officers employed. But, on the other hand, the
number of police officers influences the amount of crime. The question
is not one of which came first, but what influences what. The answer is,
they both influence each other.
As the number of crimes rise, citizens are more apt to increase
funding of the police force so as to hire more officers. Similarly, if the
amount of crime decreases, the citizens would rather spend their tax
money elsewhere. The size of the police force, therefore, is dependent on
the amount of crime. At the same time, the size of the police force
influences the amount of crime. “Police reduce crime either via
deterrence (preventing the commission of the initial crime due to an
increased likelihood of being caught), or through incapacitation (catching
repeat offenders so they cannot commit future crimes)” [Levitt, 1997,
17

18

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2001

278]. Therefore with more police, crime is reduced. Consequently, the
occurrence of crime is dependent on the size of the police force. There
is a dual dependency between the two.
Because of the dual dependency, this relationship can be difficult to
model with linear regression. Although econometrics can be used to
model dual relationships, there may be another way. This other way is by
using a system of differential equations. The system of differential
equations derived will be very basic, but will provide useful information
for understanding the relationship between police and criminals. With
this understanding, public officials will be better equipped to make policy
decisions.

II. Background
To better understand the model about to be presented, some mathematics
needs to be explained. A derivative is the rate of change of a given
variable with respect to some other variable. This is sometimes referred
to as the marginal of that variable (e.g. marginal cost, marginal revenue,
etc.). “A differential equation is a relationship between a function of time
and its derivatives [Braun, 1993, 1].” This equation can be denoted as

read as the derivative of C(t) with respect to time (t). For the purposes of
this paper, it is the rate of change in crime with respect to time.
A system of differential equations is two or more equations where the
rate of change of one variable depends not only on time and itself, but on
the value of all the other variables as well [Braun, 1993, 265]. The
system of equations that will be devised is based on a similar scenario
dealing with a predator and prey relationship found in Blanchard,
Devaney and Hall’s textbook, Differential Equations [1998, 144]. In this
paper, criminals can be thought of as the prey and the police as predators.
Throughout this paper, it should be noted that I am taking an
economic approach to crime and crime prevention.
The economic approach assumes that both criminals and victims
are rational in the sense that they base their choices on the
expected benefits and costs of alternatives. A rational person
commits a property crime (defined by the author, as crimes of

Cole: Cops and Robbers

19

stealth, not force. Examples are burglary, larceny, and auto
theft.) if the expected benefit of the crime exceeds the expected
cost. Similarly, potential victims use their resources to prevent
crime if the expected benefit of prevention exceeds the expected
cost. The economic approach leads logically to a discussion of
the optimum amount of crime: because crime is costly to prevent,
it is rational to allow some crime to occur [O’Sullivan, 1996,
651-2].
O’Sullivan goes on to state, “The model of the rational criminal is
relevant for economically motivated crimes (property crimes), but not for
crimes of passion and violence [O’Sullivan, 1996, 657].” This paper,
therefore, addresses only economically motivated crimes.

III. The Model
To begin, assume that there are no police and that we are living in a
society with a relatively low occurrence of crime. We need to start with
this assumption in order to better understand the characteristics of the
function. Intuitively, it is safe to say that crime will increase in the
absence of police officers. The question is, will crime rise at a steady rate
or will the rate of change differ at different points in time? To answer
this question we need to look at the psychology of crime.
A study by James Wilson and George Kelling looks at the effects of
disorder on a community. They note that
Social Psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a
window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest
of the windows will soon be broken…One unrepaired broken
window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more
windows costs nothing…Untended property becomes fair game
for people out for fun or plunder, and even for people who
ordinarily would not dream of doing such things and who
probably consider themselves law-abiding [Wilson and Kelling,
1982, 31].
In other words, an area that is in disorder is more likely to see more of an
increase in crime than a similar area that has order. In support of this,
Wesley Skogan states “robbery rates and other indicators of the extent of
neighborhood crime are strongly related to the level of perceived
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disorder” [1990, 48]. Therefore, the connection can be made that crime
implies disorder, which induces robbery and other neighborhood crimes.
Thus, crime induces (at least indirectly) more crime.
This relationship is expressed by the equation

where a is a positive constant coefficient and C(t) is the number of crimes
at a point in time. This equation states that the amount of change in crime
is dependent on the amount of crime that already exists. This means that
ceteris paribus the occurrences of crime would increase at an increasing
rate.
The graphs corresponding to this differential equation for crime are
as follows:

But, is this an accurate picture? For instance, we know that crime
increases, but does it increase exponentially or logarithmically? In other
words, will crime continue to rise forever or is there a maximum number
of offenses possible at a given point in time?
To answer this, the mathematics of the situation needs to be explained
more. Remember that a differential equation is a relationship between a
function of time and its derivatives. The key word here is time.
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Consequently, one criminal can only commit one crime at a given point
in time.
Now, imagine the worst-case scenario. Suppose there is a town with
a population of 100 people and everyone in this town is a criminal.
Logically, only 100 crimes could be committed at a given time. To better
understand, place everyone in a circle and have each person steal from the
person directly to his or her left. One person could not steal from two
people simultaneously.
Human behavior also needs to be explored. “Most people have an
underlying aversion to committing crime. For the typical person, crime
is unattractive at any price [O’Sullivan, 1996, 659].” Therefore, even
without the presence of police, there will be citizens who will not commit
crimes.
The crime equation must have a logarithmic pattern of growth with
a horizontal asymptote. This asymptote should be at the level of the
population minus the number of people with an aversion to committing
crime. However, for simplicity, only the population will be used. The
logarithmic pattern is represented by

where v is the population. Without this term, the model would imply that
crime could increase to infinity. Moreover, crime occurrences could
exceed the size of the population at a given point in time.
To understand how this term puts an upper limit on crime, just look
at what happens as crime increases. As the number of crimes approaches
the population, the term {C(t)/v}approaches 1; the change in crime then
becomes zero. Note that the amount of crime is not zero, just the change
in crime. With this added term, the differential equation for crime is a bit
more complicated but more realistic.
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Now, let us address the effects police have on crime. Before this can be
done, it is prudent to make sure the number of police officers does in
reality have an effect on crime. Erling Eide approaches this problem by
looking at the individual’s expected utility from committing an offense.
Eide presents the following equation:
E[U] = PU(W-f) + (1- P)U(W+g)
Where U(.) is the individual’s utility function…P is the
subjective probability of being caught and convicted…f is the
monetary equivalent of the punishment…W is present income
and g is gains from crime [Eide, 1997, 3]
It would seem reasonable that adding more police officers would
increase the probability (P) of being caught and convicted. This increase
in ‘P’ would cause the expected utility for some individuals to become
negative, implying that a rational individual would not commit the crime.
The person will expect to be worse off by committing the crime.
For empirical evidence we can look to Steven Levitt’s, Using
Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring. He states, “The results do provide
evidence suggesting that additional police reduce crime.” However, he
also states, “the imprecision of the estimates makes it impossible to reject
the null hypothesis that the current level of police is set optimally in large
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cities” [Levitt, 1997, 286]. Further insight can be found in a paper
released by The Fraser Institute, which says that
Evidence from the United States suggests that once the effect of
more crime in enlarging the police complement is taken into
account, an increase of one police officer reduces crime by 8 to
10 events per year. These events are spread across the categories
of murder, rape, assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto
theft…one additional officer reduces auto theft by 5 to 7 vehicles
per year [The Fraser Institute, 1999, para. 3]
There is still much debate on whether police, in fact, have an effect
on crime. Some have even said that adding police actually increases
crime rates. “Of the 22 studies surveyed by Samuel Cameron (1988) that
attempt to estimate a direct relationship between police and crime using
variation across cities, 18 find either no relationship or a positive (i.e.
incorrectly signed) relationship between the two [Levitt, 1997, 270].”
This theory will be examined in more detail later in the paper. However,
for now it seems safe to assume that police do have a negative effect on
crime. This adds the term -bP(t) to our differential equation for crime, as
follows.

Where b is a positive constant coefficient and P(t) is the number of police
officers at a point in time.
The number of police officers, though, is not the only factor that has
a negative effect on the occurrences of crime. As mentioned earlier, the
amount of crime has a positive effect on the rate of change in crime.
However, it also has a negative effect as well. As crime becomes more
rampant, the profitability of crime goes down [McCormick, 2001]. With
more criminals comes more competition for that nice Lexus you want to
steal. Therefore, maybe you will not be able to steal that Lexus, but be
forced to steal only a Dodge instead. The added competition causes the
expected profit from your crime to decrease.
It’s important to note that although C(t) has both a positive and
negative effect, the negative effect is more apparent when C(t) is large.
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In other words, when C(t) is small the positive effects are larger than the
negative effects, and the opposite is true when C(t) is large.
In the end, the total negative effect on the number of crimes is
represented by bC(t)P(t), and the final equation for the rate of change in
crime is:

The reason bC(t)P(t) is multiplied together as opposed to having two
separate entities is for simplicity. For example, if bC(t) - dP(t) was used
instead, a theoretical problem would exist. If crime were zero, the change
in crime would be equal to -dP(t), a negative amount. This would imply
that there is a decrease in crime after there is already no crime, which is
impossible.
We now need the second component of the system, an equation that
measures the change in the number of police officers over time. Assume
for the sake of argument that all of a sudden there is no crime. It is safe
to believe that in the absence of crime the number of police officers will
go down, because without crime people will not want to spend money on
an unneeded service. But would the size of the police force decrease at
a constant rate? The answer would seem to be no. It is reasonable to
assume that the greater the number of police officers in an area without
crime, the greater would be the decrease in the number of police officers
in that area.
For example, suppose a town has 50 cops, and all at once (however
unlikely) crime stops. A rational citizen would get tired of paying taxes
that go for unneeded police officers and might decrease the size of the
police force by, say, 25. Now, the town has 25 officers and still no crime.
The citizens still believe they are paying for too many officers. However,
it is reasonable to assume that the town would not decrease the number
of officers by another 25. This time they might get rid of, say, 15.
Logically, if the town kept reducing the size of the police force by 25,
soon the size would be zero. Furthermore, the size would keep decreasing
until it was negative, which is impossible. Therefore, the change in the
size of the police force over time is influenced by the size of the police
force, and is equal to -yP(t), where y is a positive constant coefficient.
In other words,
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This picture, though, is not quite accurate. It would seem reasonable
that even without crime, a society would want a minimum number of
police officers. There are two major reasons why people may want this
minimum. The first is the uncertainty about future crime and the desire
for basic prevention of that crime. A second reason is the diverse job
description of a police officer. The job of a police officer is not only to
fight crime. According to the American Bar Association, the major
current responsibilities of police are as follows:
i.

ii.
iii.
iv.
v.

To identify criminal offenders and criminal activity and, where
appropriate, to apprehend offenders and participate in subsequent
court proceedings;
To reduce the opportunities for the commission of some crimes
through preventive patrol and other measures;
To aid individuals who are in danger of physical harm;
To protect constitutional guarantees;
To facilitate the movement of people and vehicles;
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vi. To assist those who cannot care for themselves;
vii. To resolve conflict;
viii. To identify problems that are potential serious law enforcement or
governmental problems;
ix. To create and maintain a feeling of security in the community;
x. To promote and preserve civil order; and
xi. To provide services on an emergency basis [1980, 3-4].
So even in the absence of crime, society has a need for a minimum
number of police officers. Of the previous list, only (i) directly deals with
crime prevention, and (ii), (vii), (ix), and (x) prevent crime indirectly.
The remaining six responsibilities on the list show that police are needed
even without crime. Thus, there is a lower limit put on the possible
number of police officers.
Let l be the lower limit on the number of police officers, adding the
term (1-{P(t)/l}) to the equation. The number of police will always be
greater than this lower limit, and as it approaches this limit, the term will
go to zero. Moreover, this term is always negative when it is not zero.
Therefore, the negative sign on y is dropped.
When this term reaches zero, the change in the number of police
officers (in the absence of crime) will become zero. This results in a
constant number of police officers equal to l and we are left with the
following equation:
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Before we can bring the effects of crime into the equation, there is a
problem that must be addressed. Since P(t) is always greater than l,
{P(t)/l} is always greater than 1. Thus, the change in the number of
police officers would be negative and greater than the number of police
officers currently employed. This would give us a negative police force,
which is impossible.
Note that a constant coefficient (y) will not fix the problem. This
is because the further away P(t) is from l, the smaller the coefficient
would need to be to counteract the effects. To eliminate the problem, the
coefficient can no longer be a constant, but must depend on P(t) and l. In
other words,

where n is a positive constant coefficient between zero and one. The
further P(t) is away from l, the larger the denominator gets. Hence, the
greater the difference between P(t) and l, the smaller y is.
The reason l is used is as follows. As P(t) approaches l, the
denominator approaches zero and the equation becomes undefined. The
differential equation, however, will already be approaching zero at the
same time because of the lower limit term. Therefore, anything greater
than l should not be used because the equation would become undefined
before the equation becomes zero. In reality, perhaps a number less than
l should be used. However, for simplicity, l will be used.
Now, we can finally incorporate crime into the equation. Ceteris
paribus, there is a positive relationship between the number of crimes
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committed and the change in the size of the police force. In other words,
the more crime there is, the more police officers a community would be
willing to hire. Hence, this will add the term fC(t) to the equation, where
f is a positive constant coefficient.
We are thus left with the following system of equations:

One possible graph for this system is as follows:

B

A

FIGURE 1.
This is a direction field. Given an initial condition, it plots both
police and crime over time. Keep in mind that this is not a real
life example. Gathering the actual data needed to estimate each of
the coefficients in the model accurately would be quite extensive,
and is beyond the scope of this paper.
The coefficients used for this particular direction field were
manipulated to get what I believe to be a realistic looking direction field.
They were derived under the assumption that the number of police
officers (4,805) and acts of larceny (71,301) for the state of Iowa in 1997
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were already at an equilibrium [FBI, 1997, 303 & 71]. The number of
police officers and acts of larceny were then divided by the population to
obtain a ratio. The data were then manipulated to fit an area of 10,000
people with a minimum number of officers equal to 10.

IV. Interpretation
Now that we have a direction field, we can address a theory that was
mentioned earlier in the paper, namely the counter-intuitive idea that
adding police causes crime to increase. When following the curve from
point A to point B, it is easy to see where one could come to this
conclusion. With an initial condition at P(0)=11 and C(0)=150, the
number of police and crimes are both increasing. So, if the researcher
were looking at a society during this stage, it would seem reasonable to
conclude that the police have a positive effect on crime. After a certain
point, though, the police size still increases but the amount of crime
begins to decrease. This would imply an inverse effect. This back and
forth continues until there is equilibrium between crime and police.
The two main forces driving the system towards its equilibrium are
the criminals’ fear of being caught and the society’s willingness to pay to
have order. The criminals’ fear of being caught depends on their
expected costs, which in turn depends on the probability of arrest and
imprisonment, as well as the severity of punishment [O’Sullivan, 1996,
661] and the attitude of the criminal towards risk (which is very difficult
to alter with public policy).
By adding more officers, the probability of getting caught increases.
However, without a sufficient chance of punishment, the arrest brings no
real consequences and even a 100% probability of arrest will have little
effect. Therefore, increasing the probability of punishment raises the
expected cost to the criminal and will move the point of equilibrium
either to the left, down, or a combination of the two. Each scenario brings
equilibrium closer to the origin.
Similarly, increasing the severity of punishment induces the same
results, but not to the same extent. “There is evidence that an increase in
the certainty of punishment provides a greater deterrent than an increase
in the severity of punishment [O’Sullivan, 1996, 675].” In addition, when
dealing with the question of how to increase the penalty for a crime, the
policy makers need to examine any substitution effect. As O’Sullivan
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states, “because stiffer penalties provide a marginal deterrent, an increase
in the penalty for one crime causes some criminals to upgrade to a higher
level crime [1996, 674].”
There is another point that needs to be addressed. The probability
of arrest is not controlled solely by public policy; the criminal has some
control over this as well. Assume, for example, that the Mafia or some
other criminal organization moves into a community. The number of
police officers stays the same, but because of the organization of the new
criminals, the probability of their arrest decreases. With this new
organization, the same number of officers does not have the same effect
on crime as before. In terms of our equations, b has decreased. The more
organized criminal has moved the point of equilibrium further away from
the origin. Keep in mind that when the society initially moves away from
equilibrium, this is not the new equilibrium point. The new point (C(0)
= 300 & P(0) = 16) is an initial condition for the new system of equation
and will follow a new direction curve to a new equilibrium (See figure 2).

FIGURE 2.
Again, it is important to note that a direction field is not a graph
similar to your typical supply and demand graphs. When labor becomes
more efficient, the supply of the output curve shifts to the right. With a
direction field, on the other hand, when criminals become more
organized, the whole system changes. In other words, given the same
initial conditions, the equilibrium is different as well as the path to
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equilibrium. The curve is not merely shifted in a particular direction, but
changed.
If, on the other hand, the increased crime had nothing to do with an
improved criminal, the society would still move away from the
equilibrium point (from point E to D in figure 3). However, over time,
the society would return to the original equilibrium.

E

D

FIGURE 3.
Similarly, if the police were to have a “lucky streak” and reduce
crime, the society would move off equilibrium for a short period of time,
but return to the same point. Only if the police became more efficient
would the actual equilibrium change.

V. Conclusion
Like all relationships, the interaction between police and criminals
is dynamic. This paper has shown that although police have a negative
effect on crime, during certain time intervals, it can appear to have a
positive effect. In order to fully understand how police affects crime and
vice versa, the whole picture needs to be examined. As shown,
differential equations can be a good tool to accomplish this.
Though the model derived in this paper is very basic, it provides
useful information for understanding the relationship between “cops and
robbers.” With this understanding, public officials will be better
equipped to make policy decisions. I hope that the model will be a
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stepping-stone for future research. One suggestion to future researchers
would be to incorporate lags into the system. For instance, an increase in
police in t = 1 might have its significant effect in t = 3. Similarly, citizens
might view an increase in crime as a one-time occurrence and could take
more time to implement an appropriate response.
As the study of economics grows and we discover the increasing
complexities of the relationships studied, the tools we use need to grow
as well. The purpose of this paper was to provide an alternate tool to
study the interaction between the size of the police force and the crime
rate. As mentioned earlier, the model has much room for improvement.
It has, however, accomplished its purpose, which is to provide a new way
of looking at a long debated problem.
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